Jurisdictional Flexibility

Elsewhere, I've spent some time discussing my theory of "jurisdictional
optimality," in which larger municipalities are more likely to be
further from the optimal jurisdictional size. Optimality, in this case,
is defined (following from Ferejohn and Weingast 1997) as jurisdictional
boundaries being appropriately shaped and sized so that the benefits of
a given policy are shared by the same group of people who share the
costs of that policy. In more concrete terms, in this case, this means
that jurisdictional boundaries are drawn so that the costs of enforcing
sustainable forestry regulations are borne by the same group of people
who will experience the benefits.

If the hypotheses regarding jurisdictional optimality tested here are
accurate (as statistical evidence seems to indicate), there are a few
implications that bear directly on the structure of decentralization
reforms in general, and Guatemala's process of decentralization in
particular.

First, because different policy tasks will affect differently-sized and
differently-shaped geographic groupings of people, it is important for
decentralization reforms to incorporate mechanisms by which
jurisdictions can be flexibly bounded—either smaller or larger,
depending on whether costs and benefits are distributed optimally among
larger or smaller or differently shaped jurisdictions.

Second, it is important that these jurisdictional sizes and shapes are
allowed to change with relative ease—because it is unlikely that
jurisdictional sizes and shapes will be correctly anticipated by
reformers when decentralization reforms are initially implemented, and
it is equally unlikely that jurisdictional needs will remain the same
over long periods of time, as population distributions, ecological
dynamics, and technology (among other factors) change.

In the case of Guatemalan decentralization reforms in the forestry
sector, some of the elements needed for optimum jurisdictional
flexibility are present, while other elements are missing.

It is relatively easy, for example, for Guatemalan municipalities to
form mancomunidades, or co-management regimes, in which several
different municipalities can join together in a special-purpose
jurisdiction. Some examples are the jurisdiction created by the rural
municipalities in the environs of Quetzaltenango for development and the
attraction of NGO, IGO, and aid organization funding, and the
co-management regime under construction between Cantel and its neighbors
for the environmental protection of the Samala river. Where
municipalities are too small, it is easy to create larger jurisdictions
to approximate jurisdictional optimality.

What is largely absent from the Guatemalan decentralization scheme,
however, is a legal way to constitute smaller-sized jurisdictions, and
combinations of smaller sized jurisdictions, perhaps at the level of the
village. As a result, where jurisdictions are small (in small
municipalities like Santa Catarina Barahona and Zunil) it is easier to
build larger units for optimal governance. Where jurisdictions are
large, however, it is difficult to create effective, lower-level,
smaller units of governance for policy tasks which are best managed in
units of smaller geographic size. Forestry and watershed management, for
example, might be policy tasks best managed at the level of relatively
smaller jurisdictional units such as villages (Aldeas) inside of
municipalities.

While Aldeas do have legally recognized community organizations (COMUDES
or municipal councils for development), these organizations primarily
serve purposes of interest aggregation and articulation, passing
requests on to the Mayor and municipal council, not playing any role in
self-governance.