As I mentioned in my last post, I'm reading former Alaska governor Jay Hammond's second book, Chips From the Chopping Block. There, he presents an instinctive understanding of the political science concept of "Veto Players" or "Veto Points," the rough idea being that the number of independent players, and the difference in their preferences, determines how easy it is to change rules.
Back in the early days of Alaska statehood, Hammond, who was unwilling to vest fish and wildlife policy in a single individual, wanted the responsibility spread out over a wider range of individuals and groups (each with their own constituency), so policy would be harder to change, and therefore, more stable. As a legislator, he proposed the creation of a fish and game board, each member of which would be appointed by the governor. The board would then select a commissioner. Because of the role of fish and game interests in lobbying for these slots, each member of the board would represent a slightly different constituency, and would hold slightly different preferences.
Then governor William Egan wanted direct control over fish and game policy, and thus wanted to be able to directly appoint (and remove) the fish and game commissioner.
"In arguments with Egan I pointed out that even with a board, it was still possible for him to get rid of a commissioner that he didn't want. 'Since the board serves at your pleasure, should you wish to can the commissioner, all you have to do is reconstitute the board with members who feel as you do."
"Egan was aghast: 'But that would be political suicide!'"
"'Precisely,' I responded"
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