Things I like about Sorata

1. Combi drivers in the Plaza de Armas shout out their destination to
attract customers. There is, of course, only one shouted destination:
La Paz. The way they should it, with an Aymara twang, sounds like Coach
Zee. La Pa' La Paeeeiz! La Pa' La Paeerz!
2. The crazy Brit who runs the local tourist Hangout--Pete of "Pete's
Place." It would be difficult to imagine a more stereotypical
Englishman here in the periphery. Cockney accent, John Lennon glasses
and all.
3. Really good homemade yogurt for breakfast, here at "Las Piedras" hostel.
4. Beautiful views up to snowcapped peaks and down into the humid
lowlands.
5. Watching the locals' suspicious gazes turn to smiles after I greet
them.
6. Quesadillas made with Andean cheese.
7. All of the beat up Toyota Landcruisers that run as collective taxis
to the outlying communities. I want one of those. Although I would
pass on the bald tires.

Education and market incentives vs. democratic incentives

In theory, both local democracy and market-like mechanisms should generate incentives for US public schools to do a better job of educating children.

In theory, by introducing school choice and other free-market mechanisms, schools should face incentives to attract students, by providing a superior education to other schools, which will, therefore, become competitors.

On the other hand, this school choice dynamic might undermine tendencies towards local democratic accountability, in which locally-elected school boards represent the interest of parents and students. This dynamic should also, in theory, generate a superior education over time, through the efforts of parents to support the education of their students.

In theory, each of these mechanisms should work effectively.

What I wonder is if a third dynamic--a dynamic of central control--including poorly-designed legislation like "No Child Left Behind" (does anybody actually believe that standardized testing makes education better?) and restrictions on providing incentives for better teaching because of teachers' union's pressures has prevented our well-developed local democracy from doing it's job.

If these speculations are correct, it might not matter if we introduce free-market dynamics, because the root cause of the poor performance of our public education system in the states will not be effectively addressed.

Of course, this is all speculation. But I think I might have a way to test at least one of these ideas, at least in another policy area in some other countries (you won't be able go guess which!)

In lovely, lovely La Paz

It doesn't look like I'll have internet regularly here in La Paz for a
couple of days--the recent death of my battery combined with the fact
that there is no wireless here at the house means that it will probably
be a while before I'm able to get these things posted online.

Therefore, by the time you read this, I will probably have been in La
Paz for a couple of days. Left Cusco last night at about 10PM, and made
it here with only a couple of very minor hiccups along the way.

The story:

I bought a ticket with the company Ormeño in Cusco for a nonstop trip to
La Paz. When the time came to leave, however, I was evidently the only
passenger with a ticket on that bus, so they sent me with another bus
company--a Bolivian company, named (what else) Litoral. The bus ride
was pretty comfortable, though apparently Litoral doesn't provide
meals--this was one of the things I was paying a little extra for with
Ormeño. These bus rides are always longer than you think. It ends up
being about thirteen hours from Cusco to La Paz, broken up by a stop at
the border at Desaguadero.

Got a little bit of sleep on the bus (this was a pretty fancy "bus
cama," where the seats recline waaay back), and ultimately felt half
human when we arrived at the border. Bolivian government follows a
policy of "reciprocity" with US citizens, which means they charge us the
same $100 US that we charge them for a visa. The price goes up to about
$130 if you pay for it at the border (which I did). In a truly bizarre
twist, the Bolivian migrations officials will only accept the payment in
US dollars. Which was a problem for me, as I never carry US dollars,
even in the states. Of course, changing money at the border is not a
problem, but a little aggravating!

Delayed my bus a bit dealing with all this nonsense--a little
frustrating, when I'm secretly pretty sure that I could just waltz over
the border with nobody noticing. I have never yet had any authority
figure actually check to see if my passport was correctly stamped,
except when leaving a country, and as the Bolivian Migrations office
faces away from the crossing at Desaguadero... well... It's common
knowledge that a lot of smuggling goes on here. Not hard to imagine why.

In the end, at least I got a nifty-looking Bolivian visa sticker in my
passport.

In La Paz, we were all escorted of the bus, and taken to a medical
clinic inside the bus terminal, where we were all checked for Swine
Flu. Apparently, the Bolivian swine flu exam consists mostly of
standing in line for two hours, then taking your blood pressure and
giving unwanted medical advice. The doctor told the French gal in
front of me that she should stop smoking.

For the moment, I'm staying with a family in La Paz--folks Emily and I
stayed with back in '06. Feels like coming home--the family is open and
welcoming, and also every bit as neurotic as my own family. So it's a
good match.

I'll probably be here for a couple of days, before I head out to my
first Bolivian case study site, which is in the Yungas--the area north
of La Paz, getting down towards the Jungle. My only other errand in La
Paz is to try to get a new battery for my laptop. The old one died in
Cusco. There is a Mac authorized dealer here in town (and it's even
fairly close), so although it seems like a long shot, I'm hoping they're
going to have a battery in stock. Otherwise, I'll make do.

Lenin: a Rational Choice Institutionalist

Over this stretch in Peru, I left a couple of books at home (like the formal modeling book I was hoping to use to teach myself about game theory), but I brought with me an old historical account of the last days of the Romanov regime in Russia from the 1960s. The book, Nicholas and Alexandra, is a long one, but a pretty interesting and entertaining account of the rule of Czar Nicholas. There's probably newer and better scholarship available out there, but for $2 at the used book store, it was a pretty good deal.

The Russian Revolution might be a "hard case" for Avner Greif's rational choice theory of institutional development and change; Greif basically argues that new institutional forms tend to be modeled on older institutional forms, because of all of the uncertainties tied up in creating entirely new institutional models. The Russian Revolution--in some ways a clean break from the Russian monarchist past

One of the interesting things that has struck me about the story is the extent to which it describes a Russian Revolution which wasn't really very revolutionary at all, at least in an institutional sense. The Russian Revolutionaries, following a particular Social Democratic or Marxist ideology essentially adopted older institutional forms--forms which had a long history in Russia or elsewhere.

In 1905, in an attempt to hang on to the throne, the Czar adopted an elected parliament--this became the focus of the February revolution of 1917. In this "revolution," power passed from an autocratic monarch to an elected legislature which had been created twelve years prior--and an institutional form which had existed in a similar form in other more democratic nations for hundreds of years.

At about the same time, a "Soviet," which was a similar elected legislature, though less well-developed institutionally and which was more democratic, in that more people were allowed to participate in its selection, sprang up alongside the Duma.

Ultimately, the Soviet (and other regional Soviets through the country, which were similar institutional structures) superseded the power of the Duma (in the October revolution), which led, ultimately, to the dictatorship of Lenin.

Although these are significant changes in terms of the way the Russian Empire was ruled, all of these changes took place along the lines suggested by Greif--that newer institutional forms effectively developed based on older institutional forms.

One might imagine, based on some of the ideologies of Russian revolutionaries, that the institutional forms of the Soviet Union might have, otherwise, developed very differently. It is theoretically possible, for example, that the Soviet government might have been formed along Anarchist, Revolutionary Syndicalist, or Communitarian lines. But the actual outcome seems to suggest that even radicals like Lenin and Trotsky rely greatly upon the past for their understanding of what the appropriate institutional response for a given situation should be.

The Power of (serving) Evil (Peruvian beer)!

Today, I was walking down a street which I hadn't often been down--walked right by the "Comedor Lex Luthor."

A comedor is a simple restaurant that caters to the locals--simple food in large portions. Normally, these local restaurants are named after Catholic saints, or after the owner. I'll let you draw your own conclusions about which one explains this particular occurrence.

Alcoholism and Capital Accumulation

One of the problems that rural Peruvians face with regard to their personal or family economic development is an issue of the accumulation of capital. If they can't save money, it's hard for them to make the investments they need to start small businesses and to get ahead, economically.

One of the common solutions advanced for this is micro-credit. This often seems to be an effective solution, but fails to address what sometimes seems to be one of the root causes of this failure to accumulate capital, which is the over-consumption of alcohol, a really serious problem in rural Peru.

Although there may be some deeper, culturally-sensitive solution to this problem (which sometimes seems to be brought on by the tendency of Peruvian indigenous people on place a high value on communal festivals and feasts, often organized around the Catholic ecclesiastical calendar and older Andean religious traditions), government may play a strong role in promoting the accumulation of capital at a community level, through the levy of taxes and the re-investment of those taxes into infrastructure and the promotion of productive activities.

In short, I think what I'm suggesting is that, although private investment may be a more efficient solution, communitarian socialism may be an effective solution to the problems of poor communities and rural social malaise such as these problems of alcoholism.

Heading to Bolivia

I leave Cusco tonight on an overnight bus to La Paz. In theory, I should arrive at about 11AM tomorrow, though I've never been on a long distance bus (in any country) that's been exactly on time.

The bus should arrive at the Border in Desaguadero, near the southern end of Lake Titicaca, just as the border opens, thus saving us time waiting in line. Though again, this is a little questionable.

I don't know what my internet access situation will be like, either in La Paz or in my next case study site (which I think will be Sorata, in the Yungas--a pleasant place that has improved in terms of forestry outcomes significantly over the last several years, evidentally), but I have a couple of blog postings pre-scheduled for the next couple of days, all about Peru and other assorted topics. Keep an eye peeled.

Sad to leave the family here--I've spent so much time with Ricardo and Lucy here in Cusco that it really feels like I'm leaving home, but I'm happy to be moving on, as well. I have a lot of work to do over the next couple of weeks, and I'm also looking forward to being one step further to getting back to Emily and the states.

Rooster Sauce

Zane will be interested to see his favorite condiment covered in the NYTimes here.

The end of the preferential vote (hope hope!)

Apparently, the APRA leaders of the Peruvian congress are reading my blog, because as I suggested yesterday in my posting about Peruvian constitutional reform, they've decided to take up the issue of doing away with the preferential vote. If I understand correctly, were this to pass, it would mean the country would be adopting a straight proportional representation electoral rule.

For you non political scientists out there, what this means is that voting districts are big and have more than one representative, and within each big district, congressional seats are allocated to parties based on the percentage of the vote they win. So, for example, the APRA wins 20% of the vote, it gets 20% of the seats, and if the Peruvian Nationalist Party wins 48% of the vote, they get 48% of the seats. Party leaders get to pick who takes a seat in congress, out of their long party list.

This is basically the same as what they do now, except that they have this "preferential vote" thing, in which voters get to indicate on their ballots who they would prefer to be seated from a given party. This sounds like a good idea (more democratic, etc.) but basically means that parties can't hold their representatives responsible for... well... anything, from breaking with the party line in an important vote to accepting bribes or selling government property for personal profit. This is because one of the things that party leaders can do to punish you is just not seat you in congress if they don't get enough votes.

"Sorry, Jaime. You voted against us on the budget, and you've been taking kickbacks on government contracts, and you're accepting narco-cash. So we're going to let somebody who's a little more reliable take your seat."

With the preferential vote, politicians don't need to listen to their party leaders, they just need to get a lot of votes at election time.

The end result is that systems like the one Peru uses now tend to be more corrupt than other systems. They also tend to be more wasteful, but that's a whole other bag of Pirate's Booty.

All of this still doesn't fix the ridiculous local electoral rules, but whatever. These reforms probably won't pass, anyways, but it would be a step in the right direction.

Peruvian Constitutional Reform

The Peruvian congress, today, is debating a series of constitutional reforms, including (probably most importantly) the introduction of a bicameral congress (there is only one house, presently) as well as a couple of other reforms, including when the members of the national bank are elected.

You can read about it (in Spanish) here.

None of this is really what Peru needs. I'm not sure what the perceived problem with unicamerality is... Not sure it really makes that much of a difference. What they really need to do down here is adopt a closed-list proportional representation system, or a first past the post system, either to generate some sort of long-term party discipline (and thus, party stability) or limit the choices of people in each election district, to make it a little easier to pick someone who will do a good job for them.

The adoption of a nationwide FPTP system would be particularly helpful, over the long term, at the local level, if it would narrow the number of parties competing in local elections, thus making it easier for mayors to win a majority of the vote (or something near a majority), and allowing voters to get their way. Usually, under the current system, mayors win with about 20% of the vote (80% having voted against them), and their party assumes control of the municipal council as well (they automatically get 50% +1 seat in the municipal councils).

This means that there isn't much in the way of checks and balances.

If the country adopted a FPTP system, and the number of parties narrowed to something near two (in each district), mayors would need to earn something near 50% of the vote to assume office. This would mean that it would be less likely for mayors following a clientilist strategy (trying to buy 20% of the district's vote, for example) would be successful. The result would be that more mayors would follow a median voter strategy, which suggests less corruption...

Another way to achieve the same objective (and probably a more direct way) would be to adopt normal, proportional rules for the election of municipal councils, which would force mayors to work with a coalition of municipal council members in making policy.

But this constitutional reform shows the misperception that most policy-makers (and citizens) have about the importance of different levels of policy. They tend to think that national level politics are the most important (and that the structure of congress, etc. makes a great deal of difference). In fact, however, to the extent that there is a state presence in much of Peru, that presence typically comes in the form of local government, which means that a focus on local government structure has the potential to do much more to help the average citizen than any national government reform.

This is also true, I think, in the states.

Moral of the story? Know your local government politicians and candidates, and vote in local elections.