In other news, I've had some thoughts on theories of decentralization
related to ninjas and democratic accountability.
One of the measures that Krister has used to measure citizen demands for
forestry services (and other kinds of services) is a question asking how
frequently citizens and community organizations make demands/express
their opinions regarding that particular type of service (forestry,
education, sewage, etc...)
There may, however, be a problem related to strategic interaction
between citizens and mayors, and also related to
reverse-causality/endogeneity.
1. The idea behind the question is that, where people ask for
particular services more frequently, government may be more likely to
provide them. When people ask for greater security, mayors will put
more police on the streets. There might be a problem, however--the
relationship might go in the other direction. Where conditions are
worse, because government isn't providing necessary services, people
will make more demands. Where mayors have put fewer police on the
streets, crime will be worse, and therefore, people will make more
frequent requests for greater security. I seemed to see results like
this in my initial analysis using 2001 data and DB's favorite analytical
program, DataDesk.
2. There might also be problems related to strategic interaction here.
Mayors might not need to hear a lot of demands from citizens to know
that there are (or there are going to be) certain kinds of problems in
the community. They may act to solve these problems before complaints
become widespread.
I'm not sure how deep these problems might be, or how to deal with
them--it's hard for me to come up with, off the top of my head, an
instrumental variable to instrument for "citizen demands for forestry
services," but maybe there are a few things I can try. Maybe % forest
cover will be a good instrument?
That is all. As you were.
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